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Analysis of a Nonlinear Opinion Dynamics Model
with Biased Assimilation
Weiguo Xia, Mengbin Ye, Ji Liu, Ming Cao, and Xi-Ming Sun
Abstract—This paper analyzes a nonlinear opinion dynamics
model which generalizes the DeGroot model by introducing a
bias parameter for each individual. The original DeGroot model
is recovered when the bias parameter is equal to zero. The
magnitude of this parameter reflects an individual’s degree of
bias when assimilating new opinions, and depending on the
magnitude, an individual is said to have weak, intermediate, and
strong bias. The opinions of the individuals lie between 0 and 1.
It is shown that for strongly connected networks, the equilibria
with all elements equal identically to the extreme value 0 or
1 is locally exponentially stable, while the equilibrium with all
elements equal to the neutral consensus value of 1
2
is unstable.
Regions of attraction for the extreme consensus equilibria are
given. For the equilibrium consisting of both extreme values 0
and 1, which corresponds to opinion polarization according to the
model, it is shown that the equilibrium is unstable for all strongly
connected networks if individuals all have weak bias, becomes
locally exponentially stable for complete and two-island networks
if individuals all have strong bias, and its stability heavily depends
on the network topology when individuals have intermediate bias.
Analysis on star graphs and simulations show that additional
equilibria may exist where individuals form clusters.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a persistent interest in theoretical sociology
over the past decades in the modeling and study of opinion
formation processes [2]. A variety of models have been
proposed and studied to understand how the opinions of an
interconnected social group evolve and how limiting phenom-
ena arise, including consensus, polarization, and clustering.
The French–DeGroot model [11] is probably the most well-
known (referred to as DeGroot henceforth for simplicity); each
individual repeatedly updates his/her opinion to be a weighted
average of the opinions of his/her neighbors (perhaps including
him/herself), reflecting the subconscious human cognitive ca-
pability of taking convex combinations when processing new
information [6]. The opinions of the individuals will eventually
reach a consensus as long as the interaction network satisfies
some appropriate connectivity requirements. Over the years,
a number of discrete- and continuous-time variants of the
DeGroot model have been proposed and studied extensively.
Notable among them include the Friedkin–Johnsenmodel [13],
the Hegselmann–Krause model [8], [17], the Altafini model
[3], [20], [25], and the DeGroot-Friedkin model [19], [26].
For recent advances in the modelling of opinion dynamics on
influence networks, see [5].
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The phenomenon of extremization, which refers to the
tendency for a group of individuals to eventually reach opin-
ions that are more extreme than their initial inclination (and
perhaps polarizing into two opposite camps), has become of
increasing relevance in the modern age, and is the focus of
research from several scientific communities [1]. Most of the
models discussed above are not able to predict polarization or
extremization. Some models do exist in the literature which
can predict polarization or extremization [12], [15], [22], but
typically attributes this phenomenon to antagonistic interac-
tions that increase in strength as the difference in opinions
between individuals grow, and only [15] has provided analysis
for its proposed model.
Biased assimilation is the phenomenon in social psychology
in which individuals tend to process new information with a
bias towards their current position, accepting confirming evi-
dence while evaluating disconfirming evidence critically [21].
This can result in an individual developing a more extreme
opinion when exposed to information from a confirming and
disconfirming source [23], [24]. A new generalization of the
DeGroot model was recently proposed in [10], where a bias
parameter helps to capture the cognitive processes described in
the preceding two sentences. For homophilous networks, it has
been shown that under some specific conditions, polarization
arises if the individuals are sufficiently biased and consensus is
reached under some other specific initial opinions for a small
bias parameter close to zero [10]. However, the situation that
the system converges to consensus is rarely observed for other
initial states. The recent work [9] presented analysis on some
equilibria and stability properties but for undirected networks.
A. Contributions of this paper
In this paper, we further examine the stability of the
equilibria of the model proposed in [10], in which the opinion
of each individual takes a value between 0 and 1, to gain more
insight into the role of biased assimilation in opinion formation
processes. The bias parameter is represented by a scalar bi for
individual i, and may be heterogeneous among the individuals.
The key focus of this paper is on extremization phenomena,
including the formation of polarized communities. Focusing
on strongly connected networks, our findings and contributions
can be summarised as
• A detailed, quantitative argument to illustrate how bias
assimilation is captured in the model and the role of
the bias parameter bi in determining the intensity for
individual i.
• The extreme consensus equilibria, where all opinions
are equal to the extreme values of 0 or 1, are locally
exponentially stable for all bi > 0. Regions of attraction
are given when all bi ≥ 1.
2• The neutral consensus equilibrium, where all opinions
are equal to 0.5, is shown to be unstable when all bi > 0
and locally exponentially stable when all bi are negative
and close to 0.
• The set of extreme polarization equilibria is those in
which all individuals are divided into two non-empty sets
of opinions equal to extreme values of 0 or 1. When all
bi ∈ (0, 1), this set of equilibria is unstable.
• By considering special classes of topologies, stronger
results are obtained on the extreme polarization equilibria.
For undirected complete networks, instability also occurs
for bi = 1, but the equilibria are locally exponentially
stable when bi > 1. For two-island networks representing
two homophilous communities, the equilibria are locally
exponentially stable when bi ≥ 1.
• A complete characterisation of the equilibria and their
stability is obtained for star networks.
• Detailed discussions are provided for the findings on each
of the above types of equilibria, and social interpretations
and implications are examined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the biased opinion dynamics model. Section III
analyzes the equilibria and their stability for the model under a
general graph topology and discusses some classes of specific
graphs with the proofs given in Section IV. Section V provides
several simulations to illustrate a rich set of possible dynamic
behaviors possible, including some not covered in the analysis.
Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: For a positive integer N , let 1N and 0N denote
the N -dimensional all-one vector and all-zero vector, respec-
tively. Let IN×N and ON×N denote the N × N identity
matrix and zero matrix, respectively. We will use the terms
“individual” and “agent” interchangeably.
II. THE MODEL FOR OPINION DYNAMICS WITH BIAS
ASSIMILATION
Consider a group of N agents labeled by 1 to N . Each
agent can receive information only from its neighbors. The
neighbor relationships among the N agents are characterized
by an N -node directed graph represented by G = (V , E),
where V = {1, . . . , N} is the node set and E is the edge set.
The graph is associated with a weight matrix W = (wij)N×N
where the self-weight wii ≥ 0, and if (j, i) ∈ E , then wij > 0.
Let Ni = {j ∈ V : (j, i) ∈ E} be the set of neighbors of
agent i, representing the other agents j that have influence
on i. Note that no self-loop is allowed in the graph G and
therefore i 6∈ Ni for i = 1, . . . , N , but the self-weight wii
can be positive. A directed path from node p1 to node pk is a
sequence of edges of the form (p1, p2), (p2, p3), ..., (pk−1, pk)
where pi ∈ V are distinct and (pi, pi+1) ∈ E . A graph is
strongly connected if there is a path from every node to every
other node, which is equivalent to W being irreducible.
Each agent i has a real-valued opinion xi(k), on a given
issue being discussed, which may change over time k. At every
discrete time instant k = 0, 1, . . ., each agent i updates its
opinion by setting
xi(k + 1) =
wiixi(k) + (xi(k))
bisi(k)
wii+(xi(k))bisi(k)+(1− xi(k))bi (di−si(k))
,
(1)
where di =
∑
j∈Ni
wij , si(k) =
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(k), and
wij , i, j ∈ V , are the elements in the weight matrix W
representing the influence weights. The bias of agent i is
captured by the parameter bi, and is assumed to be nonnegative
except for a special scenario considered in the sequel. Observe
that on the right hand side of (1), the numerator is nonnegative
and the denominator is greater than or equal to the numerator
for any xi(k) ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, xi(0) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ V
guarantees that xi(k) ∈ [0, 1] for all k ≥ 0 and i ∈ V .
We assume from here on that xi(0) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ V ,
and 0 and 1 represent the extreme opinions of opposing
points of view on the given topic, respectively. By way of
example, suppose the issue being discussed was the statement
“recreational marijuana should be legalized”, then xi = 0 and
xi = 1 correspond to individual i totally opposing and totally
supporting the legalization of marijuana. Consequently, xi(k)
can be regarded as agent i’s degree of support at time k for
the extreme opinion represented by 1, and so correspondingly
1 − xi(k) can be regarded as the degree of support for the
extreme opinion represented by 0. The reader is referred to
[5, Section 2.2] for further details.
We now give an intuitive explanation on how the model
(1) captures bias assimilation, and provide quantitative argu-
ments in the next subsection. Readers may also refer to [10],
which first proposed the model. One can consider si(k) =∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(k) and di − si(k) =
∑
j∈Ni
wij(1 − xj(k)) to
be the weighted average support for the position represented
by 1 and 0, respectively. When bi > 0 and supposing for
example that xi(k) > 0, (1) indicates that individual i applies
a larger weight of xi(k)
bi to si(k), and a smaller weight
of (1 − xi(k))bi to di − si(k). This represents the biased
assimilation phenomenon [21], which explains that individuals
may process new information with a bias, being more readily
inclined to accept evidence confirming their existing views
while evaluating disconfirming evidence critically, perhaps
even rejecting it. We remark that when bi = 0 for all i ∈ V ,
(1) simplifies to the classical DeGroot model [11].
A. Exploring the Bias Parameter’s Effect
In this section, we look closely at the effect of the bias
parameter bi > 0 on the dynamics in (1) and show that
when bi > 0, each individual assimilates new information
with a bias towards information supporting his or her current
opinion, and the value of bi determines the level of bias.
To do so, we construct a specific example to understand the
opinion update of a single individual i in the presence of
equal information from both ends of the opinion spectrum.
The example imposes some additional assumptions, which are
not restrictive; the same conclusions can be drawn with other
similar assumptions.
Suppose that wij = 1 for all i, j ∈ V , and that the neighbors
of i have opinions that yield si =
∑
j∈Ni
xj = di/2 , s, i.e.
3there is an equal influence from i’s neighbors on both ends of
the opinion spectrum1. The update equation (1) of individual
i can be rewritten as
xi(k + 1) = p(bi, xi(k))
where
p(bi, x) ,
x+ xbis
1 + xbis+ (1 − x)bis
.
Evidently, the DeGroot update equation of individual i is
xi(k + 1) = p(0, xi(k)) = (xi(k) + s)/(1 + 2s).
We will show that p(bi, x) > p(0, x) for all bi > 0 if x ∈
(0.5, 1), and p(bi, x) < p(0, x) for all bi > 0 if x ∈ (0, 0.5).
First, observe that
p(bi, x) − p(0, x) =
g(bi, x)
(1 + 2s)(1 + xbi + (1− x)bi )
, (2)
where
g(bi, x) , sx
bi + 2sx+ 2s2xbi − s− sxb+1 − s2xbi
−sx(1− x)bi − s2(1− x)bi .
The derivative of g(bi, x) with respect to x is
∂g(bi, x)
∂x
= bisx
bi−1 + 2s+ bis
2xbi−1 − (bi + 1)sx
bi
−s(1− x)bi + bisx(1 − x)
bi−1 + bis
2(1− x)bi−1.
Note that for all bi > 0 and x ∈ (0, 1), there holds (i)
bisx
bi−1 − bisxbi > 0, (ii) s(1 − xbi) > 0, and (iii)
s(1− (1− x)bi ) > 0. It follows that
bisx
bi−1 + 2s− (bi + 1)sx
bi − s(1− x)bi > 0,
and therefore
∂g(bi,x)
∂x
> 0. Combined with the fact that
g(bi,
1
2 ) = 0 for bi > 0, one has that g(bi, x) > 0 for all
bi > 0 and x ∈ (0.5, 1), and g(bi, x) < 0 for all bi > 0 and
x ∈ (0, 0.5). It follows from (2) that p(bi, x) > p(0, x) for all
bi > 0 and x ∈ (0.5, 1), and p(bi, x) < p(0, x) for all bi > 0
and x ∈ (0, 0.5).
Note that when bi = 1, one has p(1, x) = x. When bi > 1,
we obtain p(bi, x) > x for x ∈ (0, 5, 1) and p(bi, x) < x for
x ∈ (0, 0.5). When bi < 1, one has that p(bi, x) < x for
x ∈ (0, 5, 1) and p(bi, x) > x for x ∈ (0, 0.5).
We summarize the above observations in the following
1) If bi > 0, then p(bi, x) > p(0, x) if x ∈ (0.5, 1), and
p(bi, x) < p(0, x) if x ∈ (0, 0.5).
2) If bi = 1, then p(1, x) = x.
3) If bi > 1, then p(bi, x) > x for x ∈ (0, 5, 1) and
p(bi, x) < x for x ∈ (0, 0.5).
4) If bi < 1, then p(bi, x) < x for x ∈ (0, 5, 1) and
p(bi, x) > x for x ∈ (0, 0.5).
Item 1) indicates that individual i’s next opinion xi(k + 1)
under the bias model update rule (1) is closer to the polarized
value of 0 (if xi(k) ∈ (0, 0.5)) or 1 (if xi(k) ∈ (0.5, 1))
when compared to xi(k + 1) = p(0, xi(k)) of an individual
i described by the DeGroot model. It is by this mechanism
1The simplest example of this is an individual i with two neighbors, one
having an opinion value of 1, and the other an opinion value of 0.
that (1) captures an individual who, for bi > 0, assimilates
a balanced mixture of influence with a bias, more readily
accepting neighboring information that supports his or her
current opinion, while placing a lower weight on neighboring
information that opposes his or her current opinion.
Item 2) illustrates a biased individual whose non-neutral
opinion remains unchanged in the presence of equal informa-
tion from both ends of the opinion spectrum; there is a perfect
balance between biased assimilation and social influence from
neighbors’ opinions. Item 3) indicates that when bi > 1,
biased assimilation overpowers the social influence, and the
individual tends to an extreme opinion, even though the overall
social influence due to the neighbors’ opinions is unchanged.
This represents the scenario in which “biased assimilation
causes individuals to arrive at more extreme opinions after
being exposed to identical, inconclusive evidence” [21]. Item
4) shows an individual whose the level of biased assimilation
is not sufficient to overcome the mix of information from
neighbors’ opinions (social influence). Thus, xi tends to 0.5,
which is when the social influence from both ends of the
spectrum is equal. Based on the above discussion, we say
individual i has weak bias if bi < 1, or strong bias if bi > 1,
or intermediate bias if bi = 1.
Remark 1: For some models, each individual has a pa-
rameter describing her susceptibility to external influence (the
parameter is constant in [14] and opinion-dependent in [4]).
However, both models share the same property; when an
individual i is exposed to two equal pieces of opinions from
either end of the spectrum, the opinion furthest from opinion
xi is more attractive. This contrasts our conclusion above; for
an individual i with bi > 0, the opinion closer to opinion xi
is more attractive.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the theoretical results, inter-
weaved with discussion and interpretation in the social context,
with the proofs presented in the next section. We will study
the equilibria (and also their stability) of the system (1) for
both bi > 0 and bi < 0. It turns out that this is a challenging
problem in general and some results we obtain only establish
local stability.
Let
fi(x) ,
wiixi + (xi)
bisi
wii + (xi)bisi + (1− xi)bi(di − si)
.
The update of the opinions of all N individuals in the network
is rewritten as
x(k + 1) = F (x(k)), (3)
where x = [x1, . . . , xN ]
⊤ and F = [f1(x1), . . . , fN (xN )]
⊤.
For system (1) with bi > 0, note that if xi(k) = 1
(xi(k) = 0), then xi(k
′) = 1 (xi(k
′) = 0) for all k′ ≥ k.
It can be verified that for bi > 0, we have that 0N , 1N ,
and 121N are equilibria of system (3). We refer to x
∗ = 0N
and x∗ = 1N as extreme consensus and x
∗ = 121N as
neutral consensus. Any vector with all entries either 0 or 1
is also an equilibrium; without loss of generality, we denote
such an equilibrium as [0Tn1 ,1
T
n2
]T with n1 + n2 = N and
4represents polarization of the network. Let the extreme, neutral
consensus, and polarization equilibria of the system (3) be
respectively denoted by
x∗a = 0N , x
∗
c = 1N ,
x∗d =
1
21N , x
∗
e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T .
Besides the above equilibria, there may exist other equilibria
of the system depending on the graph G, the value of the
bias parameter bi, and the weights wij . We give examples in
the sequel. If the bias parameter bi < 0 but is close to 0,
then x∗d =
1
21N is an equilibrium of system (3). Though a
rigorous proof is missing, we conjecture the following based
on numerous simulations.
Conjecture: For a given network topology and initial states,
if the system (3) with bi = 0 for all i ∈ V converges (DeGroot
model), then the system (3) with bi > 0 for all i ∈ V will also
converge.
A. Extreme and Neutral Consensus Equilibria
We first discuss stability of equilibria corresponding to
extreme consensus and neutral consensus.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the neighbor graph G is strongly
connected and bi > 0, ∀i ∈ V . Then, x∗a = 0N and x
∗
c = 1N
are locally exponentially stable equilibria and x∗d =
1
21N is
an unstable equilibrium of system (3).
In the social context, the result of Theorem 1 indicates that
individuals’ biased assimilation makes it possible for a net-
work to reach a consensus that is more extreme (x(∞) = 1N
and x(∞) = 0N ) than any individual’s initial opinion xi(0).
For example, one could have xi(0) ∈ (1 − ǫ1, 1 − ǫ2) for
all i, with sufficiently small ǫ1 > ǫ2 > 0, and we get
x(∞) = 1N , which means that maxi xi(0) < maxi xi(∞).
This points to the dangers of biased assimilation in a network
of individuals who all begin with similar opinions. One
could say the network of individuals is “self-extremizing”.
Theorem 1 also tells us that when individuals exhibit biased
assimilation, it is unlikely for a network to reach the unstable
state of neutral consensus (in which every individual adopts
the neutral opinion). However, it might be possible that stable
equilibria exist in which a subset of the individuals (but not
all) adopt the neutral opinion. For many established models
[3], [11], [14], [17], the example initial states above will yield
maxi xi(0) ≥ maxi xi(∞). Some models [12], [15], [22] can
have maxi xi(0) < maxi xi(∞), but only exhibit extreme
polarization (see Section III-B below) exists in [12], [15], [22],
and not extreme consensus.
The paper [10] showed that the biased assimilation model
exhibits extreme polarization [0Tn1 ,1
T
n2
]T in a two-island net-
work, which is also not present in the existing models. Since
[10] requires that n1 6= 0 and n2 6= 0, this means that [10]
does not study the stability of extreme consensus states, as in
our paper (extreme consensus can be considered as a special
case of the polarization equilibria, with n1 = 0 or n2 = 0). We
now detail a result on when the neutral consensus equilibrium
is stable.
Theorem 2: Suppose that the neighbor graph G is strongly
connected, wii > 0 and bi ∈ [−ǫ, 0), ∀i ∈ V . If ǫ > 0 is
sufficiently small, then x∗d =
1
21N is a locally exponentially
stable equilibrium of the system (3).
To get some idea on the region of attraction of equilibria
corresponding to extreme consensus (i.e. those reported in
Theorem 1), we present the following result with the system
starting from some restricted initial states.
Theorem 3: Consider the system (3), and let bi ≥ 1 for
all i ∈ V . Suppose that the neighbor graph G is strongly
connected. Then,
1) If xi(0) ≥ 0.5 for all i ∈ V and there exists at least
one j ∈ V such that xj(0) > 0.5, then xi(k) will
asymptotically converge to 1 for all i ∈ V .
2) If xi(0) ≤ 0.5 for all i ∈ V and there exists at least
one j ∈ V such that xj(0) < 0.5, then xi(k) will
asymptotically converge to 0 for all i ∈ V .
From Theorem 3, we conclude that for bi ≥ 1, the region
of attraction for extreme consensus is in fact quite large. In
particular, for individuals with intermediate or strong levels of
biased assimilation, a network will “self-extremize” to a state
of extreme consensus if all individuals begin on the same side
of the opinion spectrum (xi(0) ≥ 0.5 or xi(0) ≤ 0.5 for
all i), even if initially the individuals have varying degrees
of support for the position at 1 or 0. An echo chamber
[7] is a scenario whereby an individual only has access to
information that supports his or her current opinion (this
access may be a deliberate result of the individual’s actions,
or an unintended consequence of enabling technology, e.g.
recommender systems). Theorem 3 illustrates the dangerous
consequence, viz. extreme consensus, of having individuals
with intermediate/strong bias assimilation together in an echo
chamber.
B. Polarization Equilibria
For the stability of the equilibrium x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T
corresponding to polarization, we have the following results
on strongly connected graphs, complete graphs and two-island
networks introduced below.
Theorem 4: If the neighbor graph G is strongly con-
nected, and bi ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ V , then the equilibrium
x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T of the system (3) is unstable for every
n1 = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Theorem 5: For an undirected complete neighbor graph G
with weights wij = 1, i 6= j, i, j ∈ V , the equilibrium x∗e =
[0Tn1 ,1
T
n2
]T of the system (3), with n1 = 2, . . . , N − 2, is
unstable when bi = 1 for all i ∈ V and is locally exponentially
stable when bi > 1 for all i ∈ V .
Next we introduce the two-island network model studied in
[10], which is used to model a homophilous network. Consider
an undirected network in which the nodes in V are partitioned
into two types, say τ1, τ2. Let Vi denote the set of nodes of
type τi and |Vi| = ni, i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality,
assume that V1 = {1, . . . , n1} and V2 = {n1 + 1, . . . , N}.
Assume that each node in V1 has n1ps neighbors in V1 and
n1pd neighbors in V2, and each node in V2 has n2ps neighbors
in V2 and n2pd neighbors in V1, where ps, pd ∈ (0, 1) and
n1ps, n1pd, n2ps, n2pd are all integers.
5Theorem 6: Suppose that the neighbor graph G is a con-
nected two-island network and wij = 1, i 6= j, i, j ∈ V . Then,
x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T is a locally exponentially stable equilibrium
of the system (3) when bi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ V .
The above theorem results can be summarized in context as
follows. Theorem 4 establishes a result of particular interest
when considered in conjunction with Theorem 1. The results
show that a network of individuals with weak bias, bi ∈ (0, 1),
can converge to an extreme consensus (which is undesirable),
the same weak bias ensures that polarization (a different
type of undesirable equilibrium) is an unstable phenomenon.
Theorem 4 also tells us it is unlikely for a network to converge
to a polarized state if individuals are only weakly biased. The
phenomenon of polarization is stable only when individuals
have intermediate or strong levels of bias (Theorems 5 and 6).
Efforts to reduce polarization could therefore first focus on
reducing individual bias as opposed to e.g. changing network
structure or introducing agents into the network strategically.
Remark 2: The two-island network was also analyzed in
[10], but with convergence to results secured for initial states
restricted to satisfy xi(0) = x0 ∈ (0.5, 1) if i ∈ V1 and
xj(0) = 1 − x0 if j ∈ V2. For convergence to x∗e =
[0Tn1 ,1
T
n2
]T , [10] also provided a relaxation on the initial
states, requiring that bi = b ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ V and xi(0) ≥ 0.5+ǫ if
i ∈ V1 and xj(0) ≤ 0.5− ǫ if j ∈ V2, with ǫ being dependent
on ps/pd. In contrast, we analyze the local stability and
instability of the polarization equilibrium for varying values of
the bias parameter bi. Based on numerous simulations where
we sampled xi(0) from a uniform distribution in [0, 1], we
observed that polarization occurs for a large set of strongly
connected network topologies, such as regular graphs, com-
plete graphs, random graphs, and small-world graphs, if bi is
much larger than 1, while for specific network topologies like
path graphs and star graphs, polarization does not occur.
The system (3) can have other equilibria and can exhibit
rich asymptotic behaviors as will be illustrated in Section V.
The following theorem establishes a case when other types
of equilibria of the system (3) exist and their stability is
discussed.
Theorem 7: Let bi = 1, ∀ i ∈ V . Consider an undirected
star graph with the weights wij = 1, i 6= j, i, j ∈ V .
Without loss of generality, suppose that node 1 is the center
node. The equilibria of system (3) include those vectors whose
elements are either zero or one, and x∗ = [ 12 , a2, . . . , aN ]
T
with ai ∈ [0, 1] and
∑N
i=2 ai =
N−1
2 . If N is odd, the system
has additional equilibria of the form x∗ = [c,0TN−1
2
,1TN−1
2
]T
with c ∈ (0, 1). Among these equilibria, x∗a = 0N , and
x∗c = 1N are locally exponentially stable and all the other
equilibria are unstable.
Consider equilibria of the form x∗ = [ 12 , a2, . . . , aN ]
T with∑N
i=2 ai = (N − 1)/2, or x
∗ = [c,0TN−1
2
,1TN−1
2
]T with
c ∈ (0, 1). Theorem 7 establishes that it is possible under
biased assimilation to split a star network so that the leaf
nodes separate into 2 nonempty factions, one supporting the
opinion represented by 1, and the other supporting the opinion
represented by 0. In fact, the support can be of varying levels
of intensity, with different faction sizes, since one only requires
that ai ∈ [0, 1] and
∑N
i=2 ai =
N−1
2 . The centre node acts as
a mediating individual to the two factions. However, such an
equilibrium is unstable.
IV. ANALYSES
In this section, we prove the theorems in the previous sec-
tion. We linearize the system (3) to analyze the local stability
of these equilibria. Let gi(x) , wii+x
bi
i si+(1−xi)
bi(di−si)
for i = 1, . . . , N . By calculation, one obtains that the Jacobian
of F (x(k)) in (3), ∂F
∂x
= ( ∂fi
∂xj
)N×N , has entries
∂fi
∂xi
=
1
g2i (x)
[
(wii + bix
bi−1
i si)gi(x)− (wiixi + x
bi
i si)
×
[
bix
bi−1
i si − bi(1− xi)
bi−1(di − si)
] ]
(4)
and
∂fi
∂xl
=
1
g2i (x)
[
xbii wilgi(x)
− (wiixi + x
bi
i si)(x
bi
i wil − (1− xi)
biwil)
]
(5)
for l 6= i and i, l ∈ V .
A real matrix M = (mij)N×N is called a nonnegative
matrix if mij ≥ 0, i, j = 1, . . . , N . The spectral radius of
square matrix M is denoted as ρ(M). Before proving the
theorems, the following lemma is first introduced that will
be used later.
Lemma 1: ( [18]) Suppose M ∈ IRN×N and M is a
nonnegative matrix. Then ρ(M) is an eigenvalue of M and
min1≤i≤N
∑N
j=1 mij ≤ ρ(M) ≤ max1≤i≤N
∑N
j=1 mij .
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider the equilibrium x∗a = 0N .
For all i ∈ V , one knows that si = 0 and gi(x∗a) = wii + di.
One can derive using (4) and (5) that
∂fi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x∗a
=
wii
gi(x∗a)
, and
∂fi
∂xl
∣∣∣∣
x∗a
= 0, for l 6= i.
Thus, the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium x∗a = 0N
becomes
P ,
∂F
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x∗a
= diag
{
w11
g1(x∗a)
,
w22
g2(x∗a)
, . . . ,
wNN
gN (x∗a)
}
.
Note that gi(x
∗
a) = wii +
∑
j∈Ni
wij . The eigenvalues of P
are wii/(wii +
∑
j∈Ni
wij), i ∈ V , which lie in the interval
[0, 1) as long as each agent has at least one neighbor. Since
G is strongly connected, ρ(P ) < 1 and thus the equilibrium
x∗a = 0N is locally exponentially stable.
For the equilibrium x∗c = 1N , observe that for i ∈ V , one
has gi(x
∗
c) = wii + di. This yields
∂fi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x∗c
=
wii
gi(x∗c)
, and
∂fi
∂xl
∣∣∣∣
x∗c
= 0, for l 6= i
Thus the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium x∗c = 1N becomes
P ,
∂F
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x∗c
= diag
{
w11
g1(x∗c)
,
w22
g2(x∗c)
, . . . ,
wNN
gN (x∗c)
}
.
The eigenvalues of P are wii/(wii + di), i ∈ V , which lie in
the interval [0, 1) as in the previous case. Thus the equilibrium
x∗c = 1N is locally exponentially stable.
6For the equilibrium x∗d =
1
21N , one obtains gi(x
∗
d) = wii+
di/2
bi , for all i ∈ V . It can be further calculated that
∂fi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x∗
d
=
wii +
bidi
2bi
gi(x∗d)
,
∂fi
∂xl
∣∣∣∣
x∗
d
=
wil
2bigi(x∗d)
, for l 6= i.
(6)
The above implies that the Jacobian matrix P , ∂F
∂x
|x∗
d
at
x∗d =
1
21N is a nonnegative matrix. Using Lemma 1 and (6),
one can compute that the spectral radius obeys
ρ(P ) ≥ min
i=1,...,N
N∑
j=1
pij = 1 + min
i=1,...,N
bi
1
2bi
di
wii +
1
2bi
di
> 1.
Thus x∗d =
1
21N is an unstable equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Similar calculations to the proof of
Theorem 1 shows that the Jacobian matrix evaluated at x∗d =
1
21N , denoted P ,
∂F
∂x
|x∗
d
, has the same entries as in (6). The
off-diagonal elements of P are nonnegative. Since wii > 0
and bi ∈ [−ǫ, 0), for all i ∈ V , with ǫ > 0 sufficiently small,
one has
wii + bi
1
2bi
di
gi(x∗d)
=
wii + bi
1
2bi
di
wii +
1
2bi
di
≥ 0
for all i ∈ V , and hence P is a nonnegative matrix. By
Lemma 1, the spectral radius of P satisfies that
ρ(P ) ≤ max
i=1,...,N
N∑
j=1
pij = 1 + max
i=1,...,N
bi
2bi
∑
j∈Ni
wij
gi(x∗d)
< 1.
Therefore x∗d =
1
21N is a locally exponentially stable equilib-
rium of the system (3) for bi ∈ [−ǫ, 0) when ǫ is sufficiently
small. 
Proof of Theorem 3: We first prove item 1). Consider any
i ∈ V , and observe that
xi(k + 1)− xi(k)
=
ζi(x(k))
wii + (xi(k))bisi(k) + (1− xi(k))bi(di − si(k))
.
where ζi(x) = x
bi
i si − x
bi+1
i si − xi(1− xi)
bi(di − si).
Proving that xi(k+1)−xi(k) ≥ 0 is equivalent to proving
that ζi(x(k)) ≥ 0 since the denominator of the equation above
is positive. Rearranging the terms in ζi(x), and recalling that
di =
∑
j∈Ni
wij and si =
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj , yields
ζi(x) =
∑
j∈Ni
wijx
bi
i
(
xj(1− xi)−
xi
xbii
(1− xi)
bi(1 − xj)
)
.
Since xi ∈ [0.5, 1], i ∈ V , x
bi
i > 0, implying that ζi(x) ≥ 0 if
xj(1 − xi)− x
−bi
i xi(1− xi)
bi(1− xj) ≥ 0, or equivalently:
1− xi
xi
≥
(
1− xi
xi
)bi 1− xj
xj
(7)
holds for all j ∈ Ni. Trivially, (7) holds if xi = 1, so let
us consider xi ∈ [0.5, 1). Notice that xi ∈ [0.5, 1) ⇒ (1 −
xi)/xi ≤ 1 with equality if and only if xi = 0.5. Thus, (7)
holds if xi ∈ [0.5, 1), with equality if and only if xj = 0.5 and
either (i) bi = 1 or (ii) xi = 0.5. With xj ∈ [0.5, 1], j ∈ Ni, we
can then conclude that ζi(x) > 0 if (i) ∃j ∈ Ni : xj > 0.5, or
(ii) bi > 1 and xi ∈ (0.5, 1). If xi(0) ≥ 0.5 for all i ∈ V , then
xi(k+1) ≥ xi(k) for all i ∈ V and all time k. Moreover, since
there exists at least one j ∈ V such that xj(0) > 0.5 and G is
strongly connected, unless xi(0) = 1 for all i ∈ V , there exists
a p ∈ V such that p 6= j and xp(1) > xp(0) ≥ 0.5. Repeating
this argument, one concludes that there exists a finite τ such
that xi(k) > 0.5 for all i ∈ V and k ≥ τ .
Consider the Lyapunov function V (x(k)) = 1 −
mini∈V xi(k). From (1), if xi(k) = 1, then xi(k + 1) = 1,
which implies that if xi(0) = 1, then xi(k) = 1 for all
time k. Thus, if xi(k) = 1 for all i ∈ V at some time
k, then V (x(k)) = 0 and V (x(k + 1)) = 0. Suppose that
there exists at least one agent p such that xp(k) < 1 at a
specific time k. Without loss of generality, assume k ≥ τ .
From the preceding discussion, xp(k + 1) > xp(k), which
implies that mini∈V xi(k + 1) > mini∈V xi(k), and thus
V (x(k + 1)) < V (x(k)). By Lyapunov’s stability theorem
for discrete-time autonomous systems [16, Theorem 13.2],
limk→∞ xi(k) = 1 asymptotically for all i ∈ V .
Item 2) can be proved using arguments similar to those in
the proof of item 1), with the Lyapunov function V (x(k)) =
maxi∈V xi(k). 
Before proving Theorems 4-6, we calculate the elements
of the Jacobian matrix of the system (3) at the equilibrium
x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T .
Let x∗ei be the ith entry of x
∗
e ,N
(0)
i = {j : j ∈ Ni, x
∗
ej = 0}
and N
(1)
i = {j : j ∈ Ni, x
∗
ej = 1} for i ∈ V , and
d
(0)
i =
∑
j∈N
(0)
i
wij , d
(1)
i =
∑
j∈N
(1)
i
wij .
For agent i that satisfies x∗ei = 0, it is easy to see that gi(x
∗
e) =
wii + d
(0)
i . Calculations show that
∂fi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x∗e
=
(wii + x
∗
ei
bi−1bid
(1)
i )gi(x
∗
e)− x
∗
ei
2bi−1bi(d
(1)
i )
2
g2i (x
∗
e)
,
and ∂fi
∂xl
|x∗e =
1
g2
i
(x∗e)
x∗ei
bi = 0 for l 6= i. For agent i that
satisfies x∗ei = 1, one has gi(x
∗
e) = wii + d
(1)
i . Eq. (4) then
yields
∂fi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x∗e
=
1
gi(x∗e)
[
wii + (1− x
∗
ei)
bi−1bid
(0)
i
]
, (8)
and for l 6= i, (5) evaluates to be
∂fi
∂xl
∣∣∣∣
x∗e
=
1
g2i (x
∗
e)
[wilgi(x
∗
e)− wil(wii + d
(1)
i )] = 0. (9)
Proof of Theorem 4: Since the graph is strongly connected,
for any equilibrium x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T with n1 + n2 = N and
a given n1 ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, there exists an agent l such that
x∗el = 1 and d
(0)
l > 0. When 0 < bi < 1 for all i ∈ V , it
follows from (8) that
∂fl
∂xl
∣∣∣∣
x∗e
=
1
gl(x∗e)
[
wll + (1− x
∗
el)
bi−1bid
(0)
l
]
= +∞.
In view of (9), the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium x∗e =
[0Tn1 ,1
T
n2
]T is a diagonal matrix with at least one element
equal to +∞. Therefore, the equilibrium x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T is
unstable. 
7Proof of Theorem 5: When bi = 1 for all i ∈ V , for agent
i with x∗ei = 0 and agent l with x
∗
el = 1, one has
∂fi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x∗e
=
wii + d
(1)
i
wii + d
(0)
i
, and
∂fl
∂xl
∣∣∣∣
x∗e
=
wll + d
(0)
l
wll + d
(1)
l
,
respectively. Then the Jacobian matrix P = ∂F
∂x
|x∗e at the
equilibrium x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T is
P =diag
{
w11+d
(1)
1
w11+d
(0)
1
,
w22+d
(1)
2
w22+d
(0)
2
, . . . ,
wNN+d
(0)
N
wNN+d
(1)
N
}
. (10)
Suppose that n1 ≥ n2. For the i-th agent with x∗ei = 1, in
view of (10), the i-th diagonal element of P is given by pii =
(wii + n1)/(wii + n2− 1) > 1. If n1 < n2, one can similarly
show that there exists a diagonal element of P that is greater
than 1. In both cases, P has an eigenvalue greater than 1.
Therefore the equilibrium x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T is unstable when
bi = 1 for all i ∈ V .
When bi > 1 for all i ∈ V , for agent i with x∗ei = 0, one
has ∂fi
∂xi
|x∗e = wii/(wii + d
(0)
i ). Since the graph is complete
and n1 ≥ 2, d
(0)
i > 0 and therefore 0 ≤ wii/(wii + d
(0)
i ) < 1.
For agent l with x∗el = 1, one has
∂fl
∂xl
|x∗e = wll/(wll + d
(1)
l ).
Similarly, one derives that 0 ≤ wll/(wll + d
(1)
l ) < 1. Then
the Jacobian matrix P = ∂F
∂x
|x∗e evaluated at the equilibrium
x∗e = [0
T
n1
,1Tn2 ]
T is
P =diag
{
w11
w11+d
(0)
1
,
w22
w22+d
(0)
2
, . . . ,
wNN
wNN+d
(1)
N
}
(11)
and has spectral radius ρ(P ) < 1. It follows that x∗e =
[0Tn1 ,1
T
n2
]T is locally exponentially stable when bi > 1 for
all i ∈ V . 
Proof of Theorem 6: From the definition of the two-island
network model, the following inequalities hold
d
(0)
1 > d
(1)
1 , d
(0)
2 > d
(1)
2 , . . . , d
(1)
N > d
(0)
N . (12)
For bi = 1 and bi > 1, the Jacobian matries are given by
(10) and (11), respectively. In both cases, one can see that
the eigenvalues of P lie in the interval [0, 1) and thus x∗e =
[0Tn1 ,1
T
n2
]T is locally exponentially stable. 
Proof of Theorem 7: Let x∗ = [x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
N ]
T be an
equilibrium of the system (3). If x∗1 = 1, then one can show
that x∗i , i = 2, . . . , N, can only be either 0 or 1. The same
conclusion holds for the case when x∗1 = 0. Hence 1N , 0N ,
and [0Tn1 ,1
T
n2
]T with n1+n2 = N, are equilibria of the system.
Suppose that x∗1 6= 1 and x
∗
1 6= 0. For the center node, it
follows from
w11x
∗
1 + x
∗
1
∑N
i=2 x
∗
i
w11 + x∗1
∑N
i=2 x
∗
i + (1− x
∗
1)(N − 1−
∑N
i=2 x
∗
i )
= x∗1
that
∑N
i=2 x
∗
i =
N−1
2 . For the nodes i = 2, . . . , N , it should
hold that
wiix
∗
i + x
∗
i x
∗
1
wii + x∗i x
∗
1 + (1− x
∗
i )(1− x
∗
1)
= x∗i . (13)
Suppose there exists some i ∈ {2, . . . , N} such that x∗i 6= 0
and x∗i 6= 1. Then, (13) holds if x
∗
1 =
1
2 . In conclusion,
[ 12 , a2, . . . , aN ]
T with
∑N
j=2 ai =
N−1
2 and ai ≥ 0, i ∈
{2, . . . , N}, are equilibria of the system. Moreover, if N is
odd, the system has the additional equilibria [c,0TN−1
2
,1TN−1
2
]T
with c ∈ (0, 1).
We first discuss the stability of the polarization equilibria.
Note that node 1 is the center. Consider an equilibrium whose
first element is 0 and there exists some other element, say
i, whose value is 1. Then according to the Jacobian matrix
P given by (10), its i-th diagonal element is pii = (wii +
d
(0)
i )/(wii + d
(1)
i ) = (wii + 1)/wii. Since pii > 1, such an
equilibrium is unstable. The stability of an equilibrium with
the first element equal to 1 can be similarly discussed.
We now check the stability of the equilibria x∗ =
[ 12 , a2, . . . , aN ]
T . The Jacobian matrix P at the equilibria
x∗ = [ 12 , a2, . . . , aN ]
T is given by

1 12w11+N−1 . . .
1
2w11+N−1
4a2(1−a2)
2w22+1
1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
4aN (1−aN )
2wNN+1
0 . . . 1

 ,
which is nonnegative. Suppose without loss of generality that
0 < ai < 1, 2 ≤ i ≤ k, for some 2 ≤ k ≤ N , and aj = 0
or aj = 1, for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ N . Then the leading principle
submatrix Pk of order k of P is irreducible and can be written
as
Pk =


1 12w11+N−1 . . .
1
2w11+N−1
4a2(1−a2)
2w22+1
1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
4ak(1−ak)
2wkk+1
0 . . . 1

 .
From Lemma 1, it follows that ρ(Pk) is an eigenvalue of Pk
and
ρ(Pk) ≥ min
{
1+
k−1
N−1
, 1+ min
2≤i≤k
{1 + 4ai(1− ai)}
}
>1.
Since ρ(Pk) is an eigenvalue of P as well, the spectral radius
ρ(P ) > 1 and thus the equilibria x∗ = [ 12 , a2, . . . , aN ]
T are
unstable.
Now consider the case when N is odd. The Jacobian P at
the equilibria x∗ = [c,0TN−1
2
,1TN−1
2
]T is given by


1 4c(1−c)2w11+N−1 . . .
4c(1−c)
2w11+N−1
0 w22+c
w22+1−c
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . wNN+1−c
wNN+c

 ,
which is a nonnegative matrix. If c 6= 12 , then either
w22+c
w22+1−c
or wNN+1−c
wNN+c
will be larger than 1. Therefore the equilibria
x∗ = [c,0TN−1
2
,1TN−1
2
]T with c 6= 12 are unstable.
For the equilibrium x∗ = [ 12 ,0
T
N−1
2
,1TN−1
2
]T , consider a
small perturbation around this equilibrium. Take the initial
condition of the system (3) as x(0) = [c, a1TN−1
2
,1TN−1
2
]T ,
where c > 12 is close to
1
2 and a > 0 is close to 0. It is clear
8that for the agents i = (N + 1)/2 + 1, . . . , N , xi(k) = 1 for
all k ≥ 0. For the center node,
x1(1) =
w11c+ c(1 + a)
N−1
2
w11 + c(1 + a)
N−1
2 + (1− c)(1 − a)
N−1
2
.
One can show that x1(1) > c as long as
1
2 < c < 1 and a > 0.
For i = 2, . . . , (N + 1)/2,
xi(1) =
wiia+ ac
wii + ac+ (1− a)(1− c)
,
and xi(1) > a as long as 0 < a < 1 and c >
1
2 . By induction,
the states of the agents i = 1, . . . , (N + 1)/2 are strictly
monotonically increasing and will converge to 1 as time goes
to infinity. The equilibrium [ 12 ,0
T
N−1
2
,1TN−1
2
]T is unstable. 
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we perform several simulations to show
the rich asymptotic behaviors of the system (3), including
some equilibria not studied in Section III. In each of the
following simulations, a two-island network model with each
island consisting of 50 nodes is considered. For each node, the
number of neighbors of the same type is n1ps = n2ps = 4 and
the number of neighbors of the other type is n1pd = n2pd = 2.
Edges are bidirectional, i.e. (j, i) ∈ E then (i, j) ∈ E , but the
weights wij and wji are not necessarily equal, thus making the
graph directed. In particular, if (j, i) ∈ E , we drawn wij from
a uniform distribution with interval [0.5, 1.5], and set wii = 0
for all i ∈ V .
In the first case, we consider when bi for all i ∈ V are
chosen randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval
[1.01, 1.5], i.e. all individuals have strong bias. The initial
states of the agents are chosen randomly from a uniform
distribution in the interval [0, 1], and the evolution of the
states of the agents are illustrated in Fig. 1, from which
one can see that the system reaches an extreme polarization
equilibrium. If bi for all i ∈ V are much larger than 1, we
observe from extensive simulations that extreme polarization
is also observed for a large class of strongly connected network
topologies such as regular graphs, random graphs, and small-
world graphs. This illustrates the important role of individuals
with strong bias in creating a polarized network state.
To illustrate that there are other equilibria which are very
different to those analyzed in Section III, we present the
following simulations. We now draw bi for all i ∈ V from
a uniform distribution of interval ∈ [0.5, 1.5], so that some
individuals have weak bias and some have strong bias. If the
initial states are randomly chosen from a uniform distribution
in [0, 1], then Fig. 2 illustrates that the states of most of
the agents converge either to 0 or 1 and the final states of
the remaining agents lie in between. Again, similar results
to Fig. 2 can be observed in other network topology types,
including path networks, regular networks and small-world
networks.
Now consider the case where bi for all i ∈ V belongs
to a uniform distribution of interval ∈ (0, 1). For initial
states uniformly randomly chosen from the interval [0, 1], two
situations are typically observed for the state evolution of the
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Fig. 1. The system state under a two-island network with b ∈ [1.01, 1.5] and
randomized initial states.
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Fig. 2. The system state under a two-island network with bi ∈ [0.5, 1.5] and
randomized initial states.
system. In the first situation, the states of all agents converge
either to 1 or 0, and in the other situation, the states of most
of the agents converge to values close either to 0 or 1 and the
final states of the remaining agents lie in [0, 1]. As all bi values
tend closer to 0, the situation in which the states of all the
agents converge to an extreme consensus equilibrium occurs
more frequently. When bi is close to 1, for some specific
initial states, the agents converge to two clusters of opinions
close to the extreme polarization equilibria. For example, we
consider bi ∈ [0.8, 0.9] under the two-island network, and the
initial states of agents 1 to 50 are randomly chosen from a
uniform distribution of interval [0.15, 0.2] and the remaining
agents have initial states from a uniform distribution of interval
[0.75, 0.8]. Fig. 3 shows that the network converges to a steady
state in which the two islands have states that are close to the
extreme values of 0 and 1.
Remark 3: We have shown that there are equilibria other
than those studied in Section III. Although not shown, we
also observed that heterogeneous bi can generate equilibria that
does not exist for a homogeneous bias parameter. Similarly,
there may be equilibria for undirected networks which do not
9exist for directed graphs, and vice versa.
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Fig. 3. The system state under a two-island network with bi ∈ [0.8, 0.9]
and the initial state xi(0) ∈ [0.15, 0.2], i = 1, . . . , 50 and xi(0) ∈
[0.8, 0.85], i = 51, . . . , 100.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the equilibria and their
stability for a recently proposed nonlinear opinion dynamics
model with biased assimilation in which each agent is as-
sociated with a bias parameter. We have shown that, with
heterogeneous bias parameter values, the stability of certain
equilibria depend on the degree of bias and the topology of
the neighbor relationships among the agents. Both theoretical
analyses and numerical simulations have shown that both the
value of the bias parameter and the network topology play
a key role in determining the limiting opinion distributed in
the network. For future work, we aim to further study the
region of attraction of the different equilibria and explore the
general convergence condition for arbitrary strongly connected
networks and arbitrary initial states, though a conjecture was
given in Section III.
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